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RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN R&DO AND t0 AT MSFC
Working Paper X619
Bernard D. Wood
A.r
 S TRACT
This paper attempts to explain, for the edificat:io-,i of all
SUMASA research participants, the com?lex relationships, both
formal and informal, between the two directorates (R&DO and 10'
at the Uarshall Space Flight Center as they existed prior to
the reorganization of February, 1969. Through a detailed expan-
sion of selected sections of the official organization cLart, a
typical interaction between a s •.ib-system manager in IO anc a par-
ticular section of one laboratory in R&DO was ctxamiaed,
The formal channe l.s, the management matrices, and the: modes
of informal contact were reviewed as seen from the perspective
of our numerous interviews at that center. In addition, the
Change Board and the management "Ievels" throughout the Apullo
program were examined.
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Scope of Our Investigation
The concepts we are presenting in today's seminar (of which this is
one of four parts) are related to the study of the Role of the Project
Manager, which is one of the investigations spcnnsured by NASA through
the Syracuse University/NASA prograw. Early in our work, we decided to
concentrate our efforts in the Apollo program, and more specifically the
Saturn V program of Apollo. We 1aiew that this war: still very large, but
I am sure I can say that no individual in the group -- from Business Ad-
ministration, Political Science, Sociology, or Engineering -- had but
the slightest inkling of the enormity and complexity of both the admin-
istrative and the engineering problems involved.
The four volumes from the Office of Nanned Spacee blight on Apollo
Program I-'Ianagement, covering Headquarters and the three centers DISC,
MSFC, and KSC), contain so much information so briefly stated and suc--
Cinctly summarized that they instill false confidence in the research
worker.
We noted (indeed it was specifically pointed out to us) that the
;relationships among a sub-system raunager from program management, a
technical expert. within NASA, and a contractor's representative became
a critical fr.ctor in achieving the goals of performance, schedule, and
cost for sub-components of the whole system and therefore for the system
itself. 11iis is jut,,  one aspect of our enquiry, but we feel that it is
a critical ore.
C
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I myself have taken on the task of examining one side of this
triangle at the Marshall Space Flight Center. In conjunction with
Professor Wilemon who is concentrating on the project and sub-system
managers, and Professor Drucker who is concerning himself primarily
with relationships with contractors, I am looking at the relation-
ship (interface, if you will) between project or sub--system managers
in Industrial operatfons (now Program Management) and technical. per-
sonnet in the Research and Development Operatioas (nmy
 essentially
Science and Engineering) at ITSFC .
J
Organization Chart of MS FC
The chart I am presenting (Figure 2.) shows the basic or.ganizatirni
of the Marshall Space Flight Center as of October, 1968. There were
significant changes in this organization in rebruary, 1969, but the
center is still in a transition stage, and 'LL will be more useful to
deal with the recent past. The relnLionships I want to discuss will
remain very much the same T believe. (The changes made in February,
1969, are sunnn sized in an Appendix to this paper. A chart of the new
organization, dated February 14, 1969, is appenoed also.)
Figure 1 is just a siceleton of the organization chart. (This Fig-
ure and Figures 2 and 3 were projected on a screen :luring the oral pre-
sentation of the paper.) Only a few boxes have been filled in and I
sizall concentrate on those particular ones laL-er. 1 Grant you to notice
particularly the division, below the center staff function offices, of
0
9	 14SFC into two major directorates. What does not snow is that the vast
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majority of center personnel work under t1it RC.DO directorate , and that
most of the center budget passes through Lhe hands of the I.O. direc-
torate. Also, what does not show is the relationship with Headquarters,
particularly the Office of banned Space Flight and the Apollo Progr.ain
Office, in Washington. We must reuien6er that, through this decade, most
of the activity here and throughout NASA has been directed towards the
Ppollo program and thirs t at this center much of that is focused on that
one box inarlced Saturn V, the launch vehicle to put a man on the c000n.
The apparent conflict  of loyalties, to the ;;enter and to tLe Pro-
gram, are partly resolved when we realize that the Director of the
LE	 kLirshall Spree Flight 'enter, Dr. Von Braun, has been given the responst-
bi.liLy "for the develownent, fabrication, assembly, and testing of the
large launch vehicles required in the Apollo progr=." Also, the Direc-
tor of indust-rial Operawions at PLSFC, General O'Cunner, is responsible
"for, conducting and M.311<<ging Launch Vehicle System Projects" and he
"acts as the Apollo Program iianager at this Cen;7er." Both of these men
f9	 oversee other projects as well, but they have specific places In the
ki	 4^pollo program organization.
1
is
	
	 A generalization frequently encountered in discussions about the
two directorates at MFC is Lhat Industrial Operations is essentially
task orient..4, primarily concerned with performance, schedule, and
cost, while Research and Development Operations is dicc;pline oriented,
concerned only with perforraance. This is a gross over-simplificaL ion,,
Even in our limited interviewing, we have found many examples of cost
consciousness originating with R&DO personnel, and certainly we have
6
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found an undersrnndable concern with schedule deadlines in addition to
a pr1de W performance in that seme side of the house. Nevertheless,
it is true that the final responsibility for cost and schedule rests
with the program and project managers, and it is inevitabi.e that some
of the more bitter conflicts between the two directorates have stemmed
rom that furmal responsibility which has sometimes forced the managers
to mrke a decision contrary to the advice of their m,n in-house experts
who are in R&DO.
I.O./R. & D.O. RclaLionships
Perhaps the beat way to appreciate the complexity of relationships
between the two diract-craces at MSFC is to trace through those director-
ates to their smallest working elewenLs, the sub-system manager in I.J.
.:ind the ?.a')oraLory sect-iai in R. & D.O. To do this (in Figure 2), I
have selected as an a:ugmple sub-system managers in the Engineering func-
Lions of the SII stage (project) of the Saturn V program. Also, quite
lrbitrarily, I have aelected the Environmental Control section of Lhe
Mechnnical Systems branch of the Propulsion divi3ion of the Propulsion
and Vahlcle Engineering laboratory. So that we can trece formal rela-
tionships, it has been ncce'sary to identify also the Project- Support
Office within Lhe Systems Engineering office, a ataff office iu the
R. & D.O. directorate. Further, one must note that there is a Systems
Enginecr.ing/Project office within the P. & V.E,. laboratory. Although
it may riot be referred to ns such, this is an exrunple of a functional
Coffice being "zo-located" in nnother organization, reporting both to
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the director of that organizntion (the P. & V.E. laboratory in this
case) and to the ;aren t office ( Project Support in Systems Engineering).
Again to emphasize the complexity of the whole organization, we
should note the following:
a) Saturn V is one of four program o+'f!ces currently in I.O. The others
are:
Saturn I/IB
Saturn /Apollo Applications
Engineo
b) The SIT project manager is one of five project (or stage) managers
in the Saturn V program. 'the othcra are:
SIC
S I VB
f
In:3 trumcnt Unit (IU )
Vehicle Ground Support Equipment (GSE)
c) Enb ineering is one of seven stage functions of SI1. The others
are:
Pro8rcm Control
Test
Reliobil .aty and Quality Assurance (R. & Q.A.)
i
t	 riannufncturin;
Confi . gtiration Management
Logistics
i^	 r^r
0
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d) Three sub -system engineers are shotm on the chart, but in this par-
ticular office there is also a chief engineering manager (riot
shown). Other offices may have mure or fewer suh-ey;;tem managers.
e) In R. & D.O. there are eight laboratories:
Aero-Astrodynamics
Astriunics
Computation
Manufacturing Engineering
Propulsion and Vehicle Engincering
Quality and Reliability Assurance
Space Sciences
Test
f) In the 2. & V.E. Laboratory there are four divisions:
Vehicle Systems
Pr opu lc ion
Struc-sres
Materials
ir) The Propulsion division of F. & V.E. Laboratory has Five branches:
Engine and Prxier
Fluid-Thermal Systems
Mech nicat Systems
Applied Research
Fropulsi_nn Systems
t
67
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c
h) Not sh(7.,m (n the c ►►art is the Projects office for the Propulsioci
division which has three engine project engineers (F-1, J-2 1, H-1)
as well as project engineers for Saturn W, Saturn 1B, S-IC and
SIB, S11, S1 VB, and AAP. 'These are liason men for the correspond-
Ong program and project offices in 1.0.
i) The Mechanical Systems branch has four sections:
Advanced Design
Electro-Mechanical Systems
Lnvi.r=menLal Control.
Fluid Control
Fluid feed
,j) Sections, branches, and divisions have chiefs; laboratories have
director"o ; progrfuns, projects and stages have managers; and all
these men have deputies and assistints.
k) These are all in ^iddition to all the staff suppo_ t and functions
offices that- were shmin in Figure 1 and that are quite complex in
themselves.
It is nosy
 clear that not all the management going on at this
center is going on in Progrcni o_- Project management. But we could see
that Lhis had to fie so from the historical develolxnent of project man-
adement here (as outlined by Professor cooler). 14SFC was not created
from nothing. T ts nucleus was formed under I.-he army in Pledstone Arsenal.
• i
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Its technical competence grew up in the laboratories, and to a very
large extent stays there. That operation requires a tremendous man-
agement scheme of its own which is essentially a line-and-staff organ-
izata".M.
Formal Channels
No formal agreement for the R. & D.O. laboratories to provide
time or facilities to a project (which, after all, would require an
allocation of funds) can be made without the knowledge and agreement
of th:; Projects Support Office of Systems Engineering/Project Office
located in that laboratory. Formal agreement for time and facilities
allocations must eventually be inside, when it has been determined what
the requirements are likely to be.
:tana&eraent Matrices
The number of individuals in I,0. who must communicate with
various parts of R. & D,O^ make it impossible to diagram such com-
munication channels on a chart. Designated laboratory personnel
are therefore listed in matrix. forma For the Saturn V program alone,
the R. & D.O. points of commitment (persons who can offici .? iy commit:
the Laboratories for services), the designated technical persons (who
cannot), the contractor counterparts and resident managers, the I.O.
program, project, and sub ,-system managers, all are noted on 23 matrices„
each ona a:pnrate sheet, which states who officially interacts with
whom.
6I
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The development of such coiaplex matrices, the insistence on
their being up Lo date, and the heavy reliance on them in day-to-day
operation apparently constitute a management innovation peculiar t 1
the Saturn V program and represent a real contribution to the manage-
ment techniques of complex technological prograras .
Informal Contacts
The Lelephone is the most important instrument in the whole man-
r►geme fit scheme. The frequency of telephone contact between individ-
uals in Y.O, and in R. & D.U. (as well as between these men and their
counGerptrrLs at the contractors and at the other cen;:ers) is unheliev••
ably high. And more often than not, these phone calls are by-passing
official channels.
The routes of formtil communication, so carefully layed out to
ensure maintenance of technical and financial responsibility, are too
complex and time cons=ing for a time-critical program such as Apollo,
KnmAedge res..des with people despite their office locations. Techni-
cal assistance and the willingness to e-tpedite a soluL• ior_ with or with-
out official direction may depend on mutual trust and respect and on per-
sonal commitment-, dedication, and enthusiasm for the program.
Thus, the Project Support office in R. & D.O. will coramunicote
in orma fly with the Saturn V program office, and serves as a channel
for Saturn V to Operations Management and Experiments, which are two
sta Ff offices in R. & D.O. tiomparnble to Systems Engineeri.n , Simi-
larly, Project Support must: deal directly wi::h sub-system rann rgers and
Ft:	
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with designated or unde;ignnted engineers in the various laboratories.
llcn7 frequently does a mean by-piss his o;,rn superior or the sup-
erior of a man he wishes to contact? The answer depends primarily on
his own personality and style and on the personality and style of the
superiors concerned. (David Wilemon is commenting separately on the
personality, style, and technical competenea of project managers.) It
depends r.s well on his own background. There is considerable mobility
of personnel within the centers and throughout NASA. (John Cuero is
dealing separately with the question of mobility.) Many cub-system
managers in I.O. have come frora R. & D.O. .:nd kncni the tlen they have
to talk to very well.. This crass-iobility is an advrnta^;e UoLli ways.
One laboratory manager in co:rrarenting on the riove of one of his own sub-
ordinates to a sub-system manager's posit- on tn I.O. Gaid, "It is use-
ful to hove a friendly Indian over there."
i
A project or sub-system manage:: who coins from industry or from
i NASA but not M3FC (and many do) has this problem of penetrnLing thei
R. & D.O. directorate added to his already camplex job. Sortie have
cm:m±ented ai the time neceserxy to establish informal contacts.
Lead Laboratories
It is in the nature of the Apollo Program and all others at
MSFC that many problems c i.ther i.denti feed in the early st as ges or con-
cepi-ion and design or encount-e'red during tre,iring and accrual missions
are likely to cut: across the boundaries of the disciplines around which
1 4)	 the laboratories are organized. [Than unforeseen problems arise s they
•
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T. G
U	 may have to be dealt with an a crisis Sec:ause of the importance of
schedule throughout the program.
ror tic-,e multi-disciplinary or multi-laboratory problems, n
lead laboratory is designated by the director of R. & D.O. It seems
that the designation of a lead laboratory depends primarily on the
individual chosen to lend the investigation and hin particular affil-
intion rather than on a logical Inboratory, though the two consider-
ati ona are hard to separate.
The direct-or of the :lead Laboratory then puts together a team
6 from throughout the center, primarily from R. & D.O., and the other
laboratories involved become supporting laboratories. An engineering
manager is designated by the lead lab. director and eacli supporting
lab. designatas a project: engineer for ne particular problem,
This practice of drawing a working group from all concerned
laboratories provides a flexibility in the operation of the R. & D.O.
side of MSFC that agcin is not apparent from the .foruial organization
charts.
Cha fe Boards
Throughout the A pollo program, there are change boards to deal
with hardware changes proposed or reque3ted after design completion.
These boards operate st level3 0, r, H, III, ITT , and C that exactly
parallel the managerr_cnt levels in the Apollo program. These levels
are shovm in Figure 3.
Engineering change pr. oposals (ECP's) originate cii.th the co^ztrac-
ai6
iko
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Figure 3
CHAIJGE CONTROL AND CONFIGURATION COW7.ROL BOARD LEVELS
(SAW AS MANAGEMENT LEVELS)
LEVEL 0	 NASA Administrator
Manned Space Flight Office
MSF Management Council
Science and Technology Advisory Board
MSF Experiments Board
APOLLO Executive Group
LEVEL I
	 APOLLO Program Office, Headquarters
LEVEL II
	 Manned Spacecraft Center Director
Marshall Space Flight Center Director
Kennedy Space Center Director
Program Managers
Research "-nd Development Laboratories
LEVEL Iii
	 Project Managers
Research and D--ve lopinent Laboratories
LEVEL IV	 Sub-System Managers
Contractor Resident Managers
R. & D.O. Personnel
LEVEL V
	 At Contractor's Plant
C
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tor, and ettgiiieering change requc:;t:s (ECR's) originate: usually from
within R.D. & 0. These proposals or requests, howi-ver. , follov lengthy
informal discussions in the critical team made up of the sub-system
manager from I.O., the R. D. & 0. designated technical person, and the
contrractor's engineer who is the coun`erpart to the particular sub-
system ninnager. There is continuous interplay within the te8m with
any one of the members taking the Initiative, usually by means of a
telephone cull.
Configuration C._atrol Board directives to implement a change
will come from the C.C. Board at the appropriate level, established
by what other elements are affected (impacted) by the change. But
these .irectives follow the decisions of the Change Boards after all
arguments from mananeatent, laboratories, and contractors have Meer
he and .
Naturally, there will be differ pz_ces of opinion concerning al-
most all changes, and it is not always possible to reach compromises
satisfactory to every party. It is fundamental to project. management
that tac .ippropr• iate manager in I.O. (for levels IV and 111) or at
'leadquar:teis (for levels II, I, And 0) must make the final decisions.
Where R. & D.O. d .sagree at a lm7er level ;
 the problem can be forced
to a higher level for decision if the Line management within R. & D.O.
is trilling to push it. in other- words, whether a technical person in
a laboratory can pursue his minority report, takin& it to a higher
level, apparently depends on his ability Lo convince his mn .superior
o7ithin the R. & D.O. organization.
•
c
Concluding Remarks
Fro,n our trips both to ' .ISFC and to toe other centers and from
our interviews to date, we remain convinced that the original premise
of our investigation was valid: the triangle formed by a sub--system
manager in I.O., a technical persun from R.& D.O., and a cpatractor's
representative is a critical structural member: in the management irxme-
work of NASA at MSFC. The relationships among these three men c -An fac-
ilitate or iiapede the work of the project manager and, consequently,
of the program manager. This epitomizes the checks and balances oper-
ating in the decision .Waking that involves program management,, in-house
expertise, -ad the contractor.
I has ► .er, to sey, however, that what I have described is in soave
ways peculiar to ttic Marshall Space Plight Center. It if; affected by
the history of that centei. , by its ,management personnel, and by the
type of work done at MSFC in contrast to the functions of the other
centers. At this paint we are neither ready to generalize on some of
our observations ncr to itemize differences between HSFC and other cen--
tens.
It is likely that a closer study of the February, 1969, reorgan-
ization of MSFC, outlined briefly in the Appendix, will help reveal some
of the strong and some of the weak features of the previous organization.
It is too early to tell. At the same time, it must be remembered that
this reorganization reflects primarily a shift to a new phase: in the
Apollo program and the whole NASA operation.
4
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APPENDICES
Figure A-1
	 Directory Chart, HSFC, October, 1968
Figure A--2	 Organization Chart, MSFC, February, 1969
Changes at MSFC, February, 1969 (Summary)
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6CHANGES, AT MSFC , FEP AUARY A- 1969
r
A. RESEARC11 AAD DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS CHANGED TO SCIENCE AND F.NGIIV-
MING_DIRFCTURA'I'E.
Retained:
1. Aer.o-Astrodynamic3 Lab.
2. Astrionics Lab.	 zi
3. Computations Lab.
4. Manufacturing and Engineering Lab.
So (duality and Reliability Assurance I.ab.
o. Space Sciences Lab.
Changed:
1., Propulsion and Vehicle Engineering Lab. to Astronautics Lab.
(Are these the sarre?)	 Mi
2. Systems Engineering Office to Central Systems Engineering.
(Are these the same?)
Deleted:
1. Advanced Systems Office ('Phis seems to be split into several
offices in Lhe new Program Development directorate.)
2. Experiments Office (This seems to be the Advanced Projects
Office in the new Program Development directerate.)
3. Operations Management Office (This may have been renamed the
Planning and Resources Office in Science and Engineering; see
below.)
4. Test Lab	 (Is this now part of Q and RA Lab?)
1
•
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Created:
1. Research Planning Office
2. Products Office
3. Planning and Resources Office (Was this the Operations Aan-
ngeuient office? See above.)
B. ADMINISTRATIO14 AND TECHNICAL SERVICES DIRECTORATE CREATED.
Brought over from Center Staff Offices:
1. Patent Counsel
2. Management Services Office
3. Technology Utilization Office (Was attached to Management
Services.)
4. Facilities Office (Was Facilities and lies gn.)
S. Financial Management Office
`	 6.. Manpower Office (Was Manpower Utilization and Administration)
7. Purchasing Office
8. Technical Services Office
Created:
1. Cost Reduction Office
C. STAFF LEVEL CHANGES (in addition to those moved to new directorate
of Administration and Technical Services; see above.)
Created:
1. Univer:iity Affairs (Was part of the Executive Staff)
2. Procurement Policy and Review
3. Associate Director for Science (Assistant Director for Science
and Technical Analysis: post has not been filled recently.)
